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ABSTRACT
Lucent v. Microsoft brought to the fore again the complexity of infringement damage estimates.
Differences in approaches were laid open in this case with the trial court jury settling $358 million in
damages against Microsoft and the appeals court striking down the value as lacking substantial evidence.
Damages were established on the "reasonable royalty" basis for a product which was neither licensed nor
sold. This article contends that the appeals court took too narrow a view of economics in its analysis of the
software sector. Specifically, the court seems to have applied a "perfect competition" model to a sector
which the earlier United States antitrust case against Microsoft documents as being not competitive in the
sense of the economist's model. Notably the court did not consider alternative revenue sources (like
advertising) or the use of lump-sum royalties as a funding source for small firms. Most significantly, the
appeals court failed to recognize strategic pricing behavior by Microsoft like entry deterrence which could
elevate the value of the infringed product as Microsoft strove to maintain its market dominance. Six
"Cortez Factors," patterned after the Georgia-Pacificfactors, are proposed for consideration for reasonable
royalty calculations in concentrated, high tech industries. In Lucent, the appeals court seems to have
reached the correct decision in vacating the damages, but for many wrong reasons. The Cortez Factors
should help to clarify damage considerations in increasingly complex marketplaces for high tech products.
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THE 8% SOLUTION-OR

How

GOOD ARE THE DAMAGE CALCULATION

ECONOMICS BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN LUCENT v. MIcRosoF79.
W. LESSER*

INTRODUCTION

In this imperfect world, restrictive legislation is ineffectual without clear
penalties for violations.1 And so it is for Intellectual Property Rights ("IPR"), and
notably patent infringement. 2 The framers of U.S. patent law have wrestled with
appropriate penalties and measures since the earliest 1790 Patent Act. 3 Initially,
damages were based on equity or law but rarely both, subsequently damages
calculations have expanded to add financial compensation for lost profits and then
lost royalties. 4 Most recently, for products which were neither marketed nor licensed,
at least 'reasonable royalties' were permitted, where a reasonable royalty is defined
as one which at minimum restores the injured party to the pre-infringement state of
profitability.5 A parallel set of cases and legislation considers proper ways to

*Susan E. Lynch Professor in Science and Business, Dept. Applied Economics and
Management, Cornell University.
I See Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 (1958) (indicating that courts apply the rule of
lenity and adopt the least harsh interpretation when both a statute and legislative history are
ambiguous).
2 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) ("[I1t would be unusual for the
Judiciary to replace the normal rule of lenity that is applied in criminal cases with a rule of severity
for a special category of [patent] antitrust cases."); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 228-29
(1985) (applying the rule of lenity to copyright cases); United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1249
(10th Cir. 2000) (applying the rule of lenity in trademark cases).
3 See discussion infra Part I.A.
See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1440-41 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(summarizing the development of patent damages law); see also 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 20.02 (2009).
Difficulties in measuring damages and profits dominated the subsequent
period of development (from 1870 to 1946). With damages, the difficulty was in
finding an appropriate measure when a patent owner could prove neither lost
profits nor an established royalty rate. The courts finally resolved the difficulty
by recognizing the reasonable royalty measure, which was thereafter codified in
the 1922 and 1946 acts.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("[T]he court should award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer .. .");
see also Patent Reform Act of 2009." Hearing on HR. 1260
Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (Statement of
Bernard J. Cassidy, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, Tessera, Inc.) (explaining the
economic principle of compensatory damages generally).
[T]he rules articulated in Georgia Paciic are rooted in well-established (and
arguably incontrovertible) legal and economic principles of compensatory damages
generally .... Foremost among these is to restore the injured party, as nearly as
possible, to the position he or she would have enjoyed had it not been for the
wrong of the other party.
Hearing, supra.
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compute damages. 6 While the courts are not infrequently criticized for being
excessively vague over how decisions are to be implemented, direction over factors
related to the level of a royalty were given in Georgia-PacificCorp. v. United States
7
Plywood Corp.-the so called Georgia-Pacificfactors.
Despite this over 200 year history, sharp differences still remain over the proper
methods for computing damages. Under debate has been the form of royalty,
whether lump-sum, running (proportion of sales or profit), or a combination of the
two. 8 Also under long standing debate is whether the royalty should apply only to the
infringed part, or to the value of the entire product. 9 Indeed, as part of the ongoing
legislative discussions over patent law reform, the House of Representatives most
recently in 2009 proposed a bill one part of which specifies when the "entire market
value" may be used as the basis for determining damages. 10 These differences were
brought into clear relief in Lucent v. Gateway with its initial jury-decreed damage
estimate of $358 million ($500 million including accrued interest) over the sale of
three Microsoft Outlook programs on the basis of the infringement of the one
component owned by Alcatel-Lucent Technologies of the thousands of the program
components available to users.1 1 Subsequently on appeal the appeals court sustained
the decision of infringement but criticized the trial court for the means by which
damages were calculated, remanding the decision for retrial. 12 While several
analysts were critical of the lack of detail in the decision on the instruction on
damages which should be provided to jurors, the appeals court did make a point of
questioning the "whole market value" approach underlying the initial damage
judgment. 13 Nor are the Lucent damage issues unique, even for Microsoft; i4i v.
Microsoft, decided December 22, 2009, also involved damage issues for composite
14
software products.
6 See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1915) (stating
only a "reasonable approximation" is required and not "mathematical exactness"); U.S. Frumentum
Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) (stating the Court "should have no hesitation" to
award damages based on a "sufficiently accurate" estimate); City of Boston v. Allen, 91 F. 248, 252
(1st Cir. 1898) (affirming jury instructions "to consider the question of the value of the invention to
the plaintiff as a piece of property").
7 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afhd inpart,modified, inpart,446 F.2d 295, 296
(2d Cir. 1971).
8 Compare Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
[hereinafter Lucent Ill (discussing the benefits and detriments of lump-sum and reasonable royalty
awards), with Georgia-Pacific,318 F. Supp. at 1117-18 (describing the prior history where a lumpsum was awarded and reversed for a reasonable royalty).
9 See, e.g., Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1336-39 (discussing the applicability and flaws of the "entire
market value" calculation).
10Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (proposing to amend 35
U.S.C. § 284 to require the entire market value approach when "the claimed invention's specific
contribution over the prior art is the predominant basis for market demand for an infringing product
or process").
11Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029, 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2008), afl/d,
in part, vacated, in part, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Lucent II1].
For more
information see discussion infra Part I.B.
12 Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1335 ("Having examined the relevant Georgia-Pacificfactors, we are
left with the unmistakable conclusion that the jury's damages award is not supported by substantial
evidence, but is based mainly on speculation or guess-work.").
13 Id. at 1336-39.
14 589 F.3d 1246, 1272-73 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

[9:797 2010]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

In this article, I apply economics concepts, in a non-technical way, to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision regarding the appropriate
way to evaluate damages. Since the Lucent award was based on a "reasonable
royalty" calculation as set by the trial court, 15 rather than lost profits or actual
royalty agreements for related products, my comments are focused on establishing
reasonable royalties. In particular, I consider when licensees might have agreed to
(a) a lump-sum agreement despite the obvious limitations/risk, and (b) higher royalty
rates such as the contested eight percent rate in Lucent for a small component of a
far larger product sold as a bundled good.
I propose additional factors for
consideration in subsequent infringement "reasonable royalty" damage cases,
referred to here as the "Cortez Factors."16 Those Factors relate to the structure of the
firms and industry, and the revenue model used, such as whether it applies only to
product sale profits, or incorporates product-related advertising.
When those
conditions are considered in the damage analysis, the fines set in Lucent are more
justifiable. That said, instances where licensees would agree to both a lump-sum
agreement and high royalty rates for a small component of a composite product
would be rare, and to that degree the appeals court justices did indeed indicate a
knowledge of economics in Lucent.17 That knowledge though, I argue here, is too
constrained by the simple perspectives of pure competition and monopoly which are
ill suited to understanding product value in markets like software which are neither
18
competitive nor monopolies.
The article is structured as follows. The following section provides a synopsis of
statutes and decisions regarding damage estimates for infringement. Subsequent is
an overview of Lucent v. Microsoft, including both the trial court decision and that of
the appeal, with emphasis on the parts related to the damage calculations. Section
four includes my economic analysis and reports the "Cortez Factors" while the fifth
and final section is the conclusions. While the final conclusions are more nuanced, in
broad terms they state that highly concentrated sectors (Microsoft has an
approximate ninety percent market share for personal computer operating systems)19
and ones in which the profit margins are very high (seventy to eighty percent for
Microsoft)20 make entry deterrence a major aspect of product and pricing decisions,
which negates the simpler marginal value analysis which effectively underlies the
appeals court's damage evaluations. That is, I am arguing that the appeals court
unwittingly applied a competitive market model of value to the software sector which
is anything but competitive, and further a unique sector in which broad use of a
software product adds to market value while exclusivity detracts.

15 LucentI, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.

16The Cortez Factors would also be relevant for assessing lost profit and running royalty-based
infringement damages, but the specific considerations must await a separate evaluation at a later
date.
17 See, e.g., LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1330.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (indicating that
Microsoft holds a near-monopoly in the Intel processor-operating system market).
19 Id.

at 19.
20 LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1335.
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I. LEGISLATION AND CASE HISTORY ON DAMAGE CALCULATIONS

A. Early Period21
The first three Patent Acts (1790, 1793 and 1800) followed the Anglo-American
tradition of separating law and equity.22 As a consequence, only state courts could

grant injunctions, providing access to equity damages, unless diversity of citizenship
was present in which instance the Federal courts took jurisdiction. 23 Regarding
monetary damages, the Patent Act of 1790 allowed general damages "assessed by a
jury."24 The 1793 Act for its part limited damages to the license price, but that was
found restrictive in cases where no license agreement had been reached. 25 The 1800
Act restored the wording of the 1790 Act while retaining the 'at least three times'
penalty stipulation first inserted in 1793.26 The 1819 Act granted equity jurisdiction
to Federal courts while providing no alteration in the power of the courts over the
27
subject matter.
Since 1800 the courts have had the discretionary authority to increase damage
compensation by up to three times. 28 As codified in the 1952 Act, "In either event
[Jury or court determined damages] the court may increase damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed." 29 However, such penalty damages are
generally applied only in cases of willful and wanton infringement or bad faith
30
litigation.
The 1836 Patent Act in section 14 allowed for the recovery of actual damages
while section 17 provided for the granting of injunctions. 31 These two sections
subsection draws on 7 CHISUM, supra note 4, § 20.02.
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The first
patent statutes reflect the separation of law and equity, carried over from the English common law
of patents.").
23 See id.;
7 CHISUM, supranote 4, § 20.02[1] (footnote omitted).
24 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 111 ("[S]uch damages as shall be assessed by a jury,
and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so devised... contrary to the
true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act.").
25 See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (15 How.) 480, 488 (1853) (explaining that the 1793
Act's exclusive reliance on a license measure for damages proved unsatisfactory).
26 Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 ("[S]uch person so offending, shall forfeit and
pay to the said patentee . . . a sum equal to three times the actual damage sustained by such
patentee .... which sum shall and may be recovered, by action on the case .. .in the circuit court of
the United States, having jurisdiction thereof.").
27Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481-82 ("[U]pon any bill in equity, filed by any party
aggrieved in any such cases, shall have authority to grant injunctions, according to the course and
principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of the rights of any authors or inventors,
secured to them by any laws of the United States ....
").
28 E.g., SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Topliffv. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 174 (1892).
29 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
30 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1329 n.4 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing CHISUM,
supra note 4, § 20.03[4][b]). See also Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The RealProblem
with PatentInfringement Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 484, 485-87 (2009) (using
experiences from moot damage trials to determine that juries are often in "a mood to punish" and
not to estimate actual damages).
31 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 14, 17, 5 Stat. 117 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).
21 This
22 See
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bifurcated the recovery of infringement-based losses. Under law, a plaintiff could
recover damages (up to 3x) while under equity, an injunction and the defendant's
profits. 32 However, there was a reluctance by the courts to award both profits and
damages. 33 Under section 55 of the Patent Act of 1870, the power of equity relief was
extended to include damages as well as lost profits. 34 Nonetheless a limitation
remained for plaintiffs who could not prove substantial damages and whose patent
had expired or otherwise did not qualify for injunctive relief. 35 That issue was
resolved by the recognition of the "reasonable royalty" concept,36 the basis for the
damage award in Lucent.37 That is, as summarized by the Federal Circuit in
SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena Laboratories,there are three means to measure
compensatory damages, (1) lost profits, (2) an established royalty, or (3) a reasonable
3
royalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. 8
Stated from an alternative approach, plaintiffs must be the basis for
establishing the alleged losses in sales and profits.3 9 In Paduit v. Stablin Bros. Fibre
Works, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals set out a four step approach for identifying
causation:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales it would have made absent the
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove:
1) demand for the patented product;
2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes;
3) his manufacturing and marketing ability to exploit the demand; and
40
4) the amount of profit it would have made.
Where a patentee fails to show causation, and can point to no evidence that
warrants a lost profits award, the court will require a determination of reasonable
royalty. 41 Because of the focus on the reasonable royalty method in Lucent, it
receives the bulk of the attention here.
Now while Paduit is not directly applicable to Lucent due to the focus on lost
sales, step two, the existence of non-infringing substitutes, is however generally
relevant. TWMMfg. Co. v. Dura Corp. sets out factors indicative of the absence of a
non-infringing substitute. 42 "Consumer demand defines the relevant market and
32 Id
34

Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1876).
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198-217 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284

(2006)).
'35See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1888) (noting the differences between the
remedies available in law and in equity).
36 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
'37
LucentIV 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
38 SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp, 926 F.2d 1161, 1164-66 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
3) Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey,

c.J.).

40 Id.
41 Water

Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 671, 673-74 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The factors are:
(1) failure to design its own device, despite the alleged availability of other
suspensions now characterized by Dura as "acceptable"; (2) election to infringe,
despite having expended only minimal sums when notified of infringement; (3)

42 TWM
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relative substitutability among products therein." 43 That is, consumers determine if
a (non-infringing) substitute is "acceptable." Of course, consumers' choice is based in
part on price so that if a (non-infringing) substitute product is acceptable in terms of
its attributes but unacceptable due to a higher price caused by, for example, the need
to use more costly materials than for the infringing product, the product under
question cannot be considered to be an "acceptable" substitute. 44 Alternatively, the
cost difference for the non-infringing alternative may set a ceiling on the royalty for
the infringed product. 45 In Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize Products Co.
the court determined that American Maize's production cost difference between
infringing and non-infringing LoDex 10 [a corn-based food additive and stabilizer]
46
put a cap of three percent on the reasonable royalty award.
Paduit also states, "a patent owner must prove [damages]." 47 That is, the
burden of proof is upon the hypothetical licensor or patentee, 48 although the benefit
of the doubt can be given to the injured party following typical legal practice. 49 The
"proof' as well must be a factual one. 50

B. ReasonableRoyalty
The concept of "reasonable royalty" was strongly affirmed in United States
Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff51 Judge Denison ruled that proof of market value is one

way of documenting loss, proof of lost sales is another. 52 A third method is
instructing the jury, possibly with the assistance of experts, on the value of the
patent and the customary selling price in that or a similar business.5 3 "This damage
or compensation is not, in precise terminology, a royalty at all, but it is frequently
spoken of as a 'reasonable royalty' ....-. 54 As an ancillary point, the Judge noted that

the market/profit loss is real even if the plaintiff has not yet sold the infringed
product. 55 The following year the Supreme Court in dictum approved the reasonable
56
royalty concept advanced in Lauhoff

willful infringement; (4) failure to successfully market other allegedly "acceptable"
designs; (5) violation of the 1981 injunction, and (6) withdrawal from the business
after enforcement of the injunction.

Id.
Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d. 1341, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
45E.g., Grain ProcessingCozp., 185 F.3d at 1353.
46 Id.
47Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
48 Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., 341 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Kearns v. Chrysler
Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir 1994).
4)See Susan Perng Pan, PatentDamage Assessments After Rite-Hite and Grain Processing, 42
IDEA 481, 483-86 (2002) (discussing patent remedies since 1995).
50 SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
51216 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1914).
52 Id. at 616.
53 Id. at 617.
43
44

54

Jd

55 Id. at 623.
56 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915).
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The 1946 Act amended section 4921 of the Act of 1819 to delete mention of the
recovery of additional monetary damages in the form of the infringer's profits. 57 As
important, the reference to a reasonable royalty was modified by "not less than"
establishing it as the minimum acceptable level of 'general damages"'. 58 There was a
controversy if the Act's intention was the complete exclusion of the collection of
additional damages in the form of profits, or merely an elimination of a mandatory
accounting of profits if the reasonable royalty standard was acceptable to the
plaintiff. 59 For purposes here the resolution of that issue is not relevant so a further
discussion is excluded. The modified section 4921 was incorporated into the Patent
Act of 1952 as section 284 which reads in its first paragraph as follows:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. 60
The Supreme Court has ruled that the term "adequate to compensate for the
infringement" refers to monetary compensation adequate to restore the plaintiff
financially to the position he/she would have had but for the infringement, 61 the floor
below which damages shall not fall. 62 More recently, the Federal Circuit has offered
a definition as the amount an interested third party would be willing to pay as a
royalty for the right to use a patented product or process while earning a reasonable
profit. 63 The hypothetical negotiation between willing parties is to have taken place
when the alleged infringement began 64 and assumes the patent is valid.65 As will be
discussed below, this legal definition falls short of one used by economists to describe
66
what would constitute a reasonable royalty in more complex market environments.
The courts have identified a number of factors related to the value of a license.
Of those, the 15 factors enumerated in Georgia-Pacific v. United States Pywood?
(hereafter the Georgia-Pacificfactors) have been repeatedly relied on in subsequent
rulings, including Mirosoft:

57 Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (2006)); see
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
5S Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 70); see King
Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

59 See John Shaeffer, Equitable Disgorgement: An Unused Power that Courts Retain to Make
Willful Patent Infringement Unprofitable, 22 NO. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 15 (2010)
(discussing the Federal Circuit's approaches to damages calculations).
(30
35 U.S.C. § 284.
(31
See Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 505-07.
62 Id.at 504 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284).
( Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
61Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
(3 Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d 126, 129-130 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing
General Motors Corp. v. Blackmore, 53 F.2d 725, 729 (6th Cir. 1931)).

(36
DR.

ELIZABETH M. BAILEY ET AL., GROUNDHOG DAY:

RECURRING THEMES ON REASONABLE

ROYALTIES IN RECENT IP DAMAGE CASES 1 (NERA Econ. Consulting 2009).
(7 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, in
part,modified, inpart,446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as
a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such
derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and
any evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of
the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by
the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
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15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringer began) if
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement;
that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article
embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount
would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant
68
a license.
Some patent blogs suggest that factors 10-15 are particularly applicable to
calculating reasonable royalties while others identify factors 8-13 and 15 as the most
relevant. 69 In Lucent the appeals court made special reference to factors 2, 8-11 and
13 (see Section III.C following).70 A slightly different classification of the factors
would place 1-2, 4-5, and 12 as setting out the market conditions in general and
between the licensor and licensee.71 Some of these factors could better be referred to
as a firm's strategy for benefiting from its assets-as in factor number 4.72 Factors 3,
6-8, 10 and 13 describe the product, patent, and license. From an economists
perspective all factors but 1 are potentially relevant for determining a reasonable
royalty; factor 1 is excluded only because it relates to an actual licensing agreement
under litigation.7 3 Factor 15 of course defines a reasonable royalty and the requisite
75
conditions for its determination.7 4 The use of expert is specifically authorized.

C. Apportionment/EntireMarket Rule
When the infringed product or process constitutes only part of the marketed
product it is an economic and legal question whether the damage estimate-the
reasonable royalty-should be calculated based on the price of the entire marketed
76
product or only the infringed component.
This apportionment issue has been of long standing, the basis of Supreme Court
decisions back at least until 1894. 77 The lower courts and the Court of Appeals for
Id.at 1120.
6 See Posting of Gary Odom, Infringement Damages Primer, PATENT PROSPECTOR
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/03/infringement damages-primer.html (Mar. 24, 2005, 11:07
AM) (last visited May 10, 2010); Posting of Gary Odom, Reasonable Royalty, PATENT PROSPECTOR
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/05/reasonable-royalty.html#more
(May 2, 2009, 3:27 PM)
(last visited May 10, 2010).
70 Lueent IV 580 F.3d 1301, 1325-26, 1332-33, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
71See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
68

72 Id.
73 Id

7'Id.
7535 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
76 See Imonex Servs. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
77Warren v. Keep, 155 U.S. 265, 268 (1894) (distinguishing between the calculation of
damages in a patent covering an entire infringing product and a patent covering only a part of the
infringing product).
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the Federal Circuit, once established as having exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases arising from the patent laws, rendered decisions based on whole market value,
apportionment, and causation principals.78 In State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Industries, for example the whole market value concept was upheld for products
containing both patented and non patented components "where the patent related
feature is the basis for customer demand."7 9 Overall, "the Federal Circuit has most
definitely embraced the 'entire market' rule of damages ....
The ultimate
determining factor is whether the patentee or its licensee can normally anticipate the
80
sale of the unpatented components together with the patented components."
Rite-Hite v. Ke]]ey restated en banc the entire market value rule with additional
requirements for its application.8 1 Rite-Hite manufactured two devices to prevent
trucks from being separated from a loading dock, leading possibly to injuries of the
workmen operating heavy loading equipment.8 2 Two models were sold, MDL-55, a
manual system, and ADL-100, a more costly automatic device.83 MDL-55 utilized the
teachings of Rite-Hite's 4,373,847 patent8 4 while ADL-100 did not.8 5 Rite-Hite
simultaneously marketed a "dock leveler," a bridging device designed to cover the
space between the loading dock and the parked vehicle so as to avoid persons or
goods slipping into any intervening space.8 6 Kelley was found to have infringed the
Rite-Hite patent when copying the MDL-55 product and marketed it to avoid lost
sales for its own dock leveler product.87 The district court determined that 'but for'
Kelley's infringement, Rite-Hite would have sold eighty more MDL-55s, 3,243 ADL88
100s, along with 1,692 dock levelers.
Kelley appealed the damages awarded for the ADL-100 product because they
were not covered by the patent-in-suit.8 9 The appeals court concluded, "If a
particular injury was or should have been reasonably foreseeable by an infringing
competitor in the relevant market, broadly defined, that injury is generally
compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary." 90 This decision might be
viewed as establishing a "reasonable possibility" of lost sales to an infringing product,
a lower standard than had previously existed.9 1 However, as regards the unpatented
dock leveler, it was determined that all the components must function together as a
92
single unit, be parts of a composite machine, or constitute a functional machine.

78

See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)

(affirming damages for the whole market value for devices not covered by the patent but arguably
part of the patent damages); SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161,
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing each potential award of damages).
7') 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
80 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1026 (BNA Books 9th ed. 2009).
81 56 F.3d at 1549-50.
82 Id. at 1542.
8:3Id. at 1543.
84 U.S. Patent No. 4,373,847 (filed May 4, 1981) (issued Feb. 15, 1983).
85 Rite Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1543.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Jd
89 Id.at 1545-46.
90
91

Id. at 1546.
See id. at 1546, 1550.
1549-51.

92 Id.at
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Since the dock levelers operated separately from the securing devices they were not
implicitly incorporated with the patented invention and hence damages were
vacated. 93 "There can be no recovery for items that have essentially no functional
relationship to the patented invention and that may have been sold with an
94
infringing device only as a matter of convenience or business advantage."
There is a direct connection between Rite -Hite and the Georgia-Pacificfactors,
notably factor 6, "The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of
other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or
convoyed sales."95 (see Section II.B supra). If the loss of a sale of a patented product
would cause the simultaneous loss of an integral non-patented one-a 'convoyed'
sale-then the licensor might be expected to seek a higher royalty rate for the
combined product. "However, proving that the patentee would have lost the
'convoyed sale' will likely require proving a correlation between the patented and
unpatented 'convoyed' product that would essentially satisfy the entire market rule
[as set forth in Rite-Hite]."96 "[T]he entire market rule appears to have subsumed the
97
sixth Georgia-Pacificfactor."
"[Tihe general language of Rite-Hite appears to leave open the door for future
patentees to attempt to recoup other losses by providing stronger evidence that such
damages could be directly linked to an infringement."98 Recovering stock price
declines however has been rejected in Interactive Pictures Corporation v. Infinite
Pictures.99

II. LUCENT V. MICROSOFT

A. Background
This suit represents a consolidation and division of three separate actions by
Lucent Technologies dating back to 2002, in three separate jurisdictions, the Eastern
District of Virginia, the District of Delaware, and the Southern District of
California. 100 In October 2007 matters relating to U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356,101
known as the "Day patent," which describes a graphics mode method of entering
information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard, were
transferred to case no. 07-CV-2000 at the U.S. District Court for the Southern
93

Id. at 1550-51.
supra note 80, at 1027.

94 HARMON,

95 Compare Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (stating the quote shown above), with Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546 ("If a particular injury
was or should have been reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor in the relevant market,
broadly defined, that injury is generally compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary.").
96 Pan, supra note 49, at 507.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 503.
9 Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
100LueentlV 580 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
101U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986) (issued Aug. 9, 1988).
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District of California. 10 2 The Day patent, with an initial assignment to AT&T, was
03
subsequently assigned to Lucent Technologies, the plaintiff.
Gateway and Dell, defendants, are both manufacturers and marketers of
personal computers and licensees of Microsoft software, including Microsoft Outlook
which itself and two other allegedly infringing programs, Microsoft Money and
Windows Mobile, were installed on their computers prior to retail sales.10 4 In total,
10 5
110 million copies of the software were sold with revenues over $8 billion.
Infringement was associated with the calendar function of each software program
which permits users to employ a computer mouse or similar device to select a single
or multiple dates by clicking on a graphic of a monthly calendar.10 6 The program
then records a "click"1as
a particular month, day and year, and hence constitutes a
"composition" of data. 0' At issue were independent claim 19 and dependent claim
108
21, which are method claims.
The two computer firms were charged with infringement of the Day patent by
inducing/facilitating their customers to use the Day patent subject matter without
permission.10 9 Microsoft subsequently intervened and was found guilty of indirect
infringement, in part because Microsoft promoted the accused features,110 but no
distinction was made between inducing and contributory infringement.'
Direct
infringement was based on circumstantial evidence,11 2 but on appeal at least two
infringers were identified, the Lucent expert and his wife.113 The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of Microsoft's post-trial
motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law that the Day Patent claims nineteen and
11 4
twenty-one were invalid and obviousness.

102 See Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Nos. 07-CV-2000-H (CAB), 02-CV-2060-B (CAB),
03CV0699B (CAB), 03CV1108B (CAB), 2007 WL 6955272, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007). Also
included were U.S. Patents Nos. 4,383,272 (filed Apr. 13, 1981) (issued May 10, 1983), 4,958,226
(filed Sept. 27, 1989) (issued Sept. 18, 1990), 5,347,295 (filed Oct. 31, 1990) (issued Sept. 13, 1994)
and 4,439,759 (filed May 19, 1981) (issued Mar. 27, 1984). Id. On December 16, 2008, Microsoft and
Lucent filed a stipulation dismissing all claims among them except those relating to the Day patent
so that they are not discussed further here. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 302-CV02060, 2008 WL 5718258, at *1 (S.D.Cal. Dec. 16, 2008).
103 LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1308 n.1.
104 See Tony Dutra, Patent Damages Reform Debate Evident In Arguments for Microsoft
Infringement Case, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (June 4, 2009), http://news.bna.

com/ptdm/PTDMWB/split-display.adp?fedfid= 12898739&vname=ptdbulallissues&fcn= 1&wsn=5013
10000&fn= 12898739&split=0.
105 LucentlV 580 F.3d at 1323.
106 Id. at 1317.
107

See id.

at 1310-12; U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986) (issued Aug. 9, 1988).
109 Lucentl11, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (S.D. Cal. 2008), affd, in part, vacated, in part,580
F.3d 1301 (Fed Cir. 2009).
110 See id. at 1029, 1037.
M Id. at 1029.
112 Id. at 1036-37.
113 LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1317-18.
114 Id. at 1308.
108

Id.
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B. US. District Courtfor the Southern Districtof CaliforniaDamage Decision"15
The jury-identified lump-sum damage of $357,693,056.18 imposed on Microsoft
by the jury falls between the Lucent expert's estimate of $561.9 million based on an
eight percent royalty of the entire Outlook sales, while Microsoft's proposed a $6.5
million settlement. 116 Microsoft contested that the verdict violated the "entire
117
market" rule (see Section I.C supra) or the jury acted purely speculatively.
Addressing the second point first, the trial court noted that a jury is not mandated to
accept either expert's opinion and that the "to the penny damage calculation" was
evidence of a systematic consideration of actual damages rather than
capriciousness. 118 As regards the whole market contention, the trial court argued
that the Lucent experts provided significant evidence of actual lump-sum royalties in
the software sector of up to $290 million while the case history requires damages
based on a hypothetical license negotiation at the time of first infringement assumes
the patent is valid and would be infringed (see Section 11.B supra).119 Since in actual
negotiations either or both points may be unclear, the negotiating position of the
licensor under the hypothetical may be stronger than in the actual, leading to a
higher damage estimate. The court also concluded that the calendar feature was
12 0
integral to the programs and necessary to meet customer expectations.
C. U.S CourtofAppeals for the Federal CircuitDamageDecision'2 '
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court's damage
award on the basis of a lack of "substantial evidence," whether or not the jury relied
on the entire market value calculation or another undisclosed method. 122 At the
same time it was decided the "evidence [was] properly before the jury."123 In its
analysis the appeals court relied particularly on several Georgia-Pacificfactors (see

Section II.B supra), as follows, with principal attention to damages from the Outlook
application.

11H5
Id. at 1308.
116 See id. at 1308, 1323.
117 Id.at 1323.
118 Lucent 1If 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1043-44 (S.D. Cal. 2008), affd, in part, vacated,in part,
580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
119 Id.at 1043.
120 Id.
121LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1323-39.
122 Id.at 1324, 1340; see also State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d
1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("A jury's decision with respect to an award of damages 'must be upheld
unless the amount is 'grossly excessive or monstrous', clearly not supported by the evidence, or
based on speculation or guesswork."' (quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977
F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
123 Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1325.
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1. Factor2:
"The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent suit[,]" which the appeals court interpreted as a question of whether either
party would have agreed to a lump-sum or running royalty. 124 Lump-sum royalties
by putting payments ahead of sales revenues shift all market risk from the licensor
to the licensee with some offsetting benefit of removing the administrative need to
monitor product sales or revenues. 125 The appeals court critiqued the trial court
analysis on three points:
* Lucent's expert in his testimony chose running royalties over lump-sum
payments, yet Lucent defended the jury decision for a lump-sum
126
payment,
* Documentation or expectation of the frequency of use of the allegedly
infringing component, 127 and
* The example license agreements offered by Lucent were for far smaller
amounts, were not analyzed for the jury, applied to markedly different
products and conditions, and included both lump-sum and running
128
royalty agreements.

2. Factors 10 and 13:
"The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention." (#10) and "[tihe portion of the realizable profit that
should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added
by the infringer." (#13)129
The alleged infringing date-picker function was presented as a tiny component of
a much larger program, whether the component is measured in terms of the multiple
features available for Outlook users or the proportion of lines of code. 130 The appeals
court "[found] it inconceivable to conclude, based on the present record, that the use
of one small feature, the date-picker, constitutes a substantial portion of the value of
132
Outlook[j"131 that substantial portion in this case being close to eight percent.

121 Id. (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd in part,modified in part,446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)).
125 See generally Philip Johnson, Reasonable Royalty Damages and License Structure: Why
Some Experts Go Running When they Should Take their Lumps, INSIDE ECON ONE (2007),

http://www.econone.com/resource/sections/i1/resonable-royalty-damages.pdf.
structures from an economic perspective).
126 Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1326-27.
127 Id. at 1333.
128
129
130
131
132

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1329-30.
at 1332 (quoting Georgia-PacificCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120).
at 1332-33.

at 1332.
at 1338-39.

(analyzing licensing
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3. Factor11:
"The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use." 133 This factor the appeals court
interpreted to mean "an invention used frequently is generally more valuable than a
' 13 4
comparable invention used infrequently."
The appeals court was critical of Microsoft's assertion that actual customer use
of the date-picking function was irrelevant as use post-dates the hypothetical license
fee negotiation. 13 5 Ex ante, the firms can estimate use through comparisons with
comparable products, consumer surveys, focus groups, etc.136 Of course, value is not
necessarily directly correlated with use as in the case of a fire alarm function where
its mere existence has value to consumers even if rarely used.13 7 That said, since
Lucent was able to identify only a single (or possibly two) infringers meant use-based
value of the date-picker was absent. 138 "Beyond that finding, all the jury had was
13 9
speculation."a

4. Other Factors:
The remaining Georgia-Pacificfactors both raise and lower the potential license
value.1 40 Factor 8 for example ("[tihe established profitability of the product made
under the patent") elevates the value of the license as "the products at issue are sold
with an approximately 70-80% profit margin."1 41
Conversely, Factor 9
("[t]he ... advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices") suggests
a lower value as "the infringing use of the data picker seems to have, at best, only a
slight advantage over what is arguably the closest prior art."1 42 Comparisons with
1 43
the closest prior art were however not part of the decision.

5. Decision:
The appellate court decided that the "evidence as presented did not reach the
"'substantial evidence' threshold" meaning that "the jury's damage award is not
supported by substantial evidence, but is based mainly on speculation or
guesswork." 144 Since Lucent did not meet its burden of proving lump-sum damages

133 Id. at 1333 (quoting Georgia-PacificCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120).
134 Id.

Id. at 1333-35.
Id. at 1334.
137 See id. at 1325-26 (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152,
1159 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, J.)).
138 Id. at 1334-35.
139 Id. at 1334.
140 Id. at 1335.
135

136

141

Id.

142

143

Id.
So id. (omitting a discussion comparing the closest prior art to the data picker software).

144

Id.
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at the level of $358 million, the award was vacated and the case remanded for a new
145
trial on damages.
In reaching that decision, the appellate court indicated a strong suspicion that
the jury applied the "entire market value" rule of calculating damages. 146 Supporting
that contention were calculations presented by Microsoft indicating the awarded
damages were very close to a weighted average of revenues using eighty-five percent
OEM prices and fifteen percent retail prices.1 47 Conversely, a 5.5% royalty applied to
the entire sales yields a similar value. 148 However, as the appellate court notes,
"There is nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire
product, especially when there is no established market value for the infringing
component or feature, so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the
base represented by the infringing component or feature."1 49 Clearly the appeals
court is concluding that Lucent did not demonstrate that the high multiplier of 8
percent was justified by the very small portion of "the base" represented by the
infringed date-picker function. I next evaluate whether the trial court applied sound
economic reasoning in reaching that conclusion.

III.

ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF LUCENT V. MICROSOFTANALYSIS

This section applies basic economic concepts to evaluate reasonable royalty
decisions as applied in Lucent and more generally to other damage decisions. The
intent is less to judge the economics sophistication of the courts in Lucent and other
infringement damage cases and more to identify other approaches which can lead to
improved damage estimates, whether made by juries or the court. These additional
aspects are referred to as the "Cortez Factors" and can be considered as augmenting
the frequently-used Georgia-Paeifiefactors (see Section III. C preceding).150

A. Economic Model
Economists use economic models in two ways pertinent to damage estimates.
Models abstract from and hence simplify reality while identifying which aspects of a
product market are pertinent to determining damages. 151 Understanding the
pertinent factors is useful in considering damages even if, as is often the case, the
actual numbers for calculating damages are unavailable. 152 In short, it is necessary
to clarify what exactly is being sought if there is any chance of finding it.
Id. at 1337-39.
Id. at 1336.
147 Id.
148 Id.
19 Id.
at 1339.
145

116

150See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),

affd, in part,modified in part,446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the
general applicability of abstract economic theories to law and remedies).
152 See Georgia-PailfikCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (discussing factors that are generally useful
in considering damages).
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1. Perfect Competition:
Two models of economic systems, ends of a spectrum, dominate neoclassical
154
economic thinking. 153 These models are perfect competition and simple monopoly.
Perfect competition has very desirable characteristic for consumers, and for an
economy overall. 155 It assures that production is efficient, and no producer makes
excess profits, profits beyond what is needed to keep a business in operation. 156 By
eliminating excess profits, it is easy to show that the price of composite product times
the marginal (next) unit is equal to the price of a component part. 157 This Value of
Marginal Product (VMP) as economists call it can be most easily understood in terms
of production; car companies hire workers until the output of the last hired times the
price of a car equals the wage rate. 158 By extension to software-and this extension
is conceptual only for VMP does not strictly apply to the price of composite
products-the producer of a composite program adds components until the price of
the last component added equals the price of the composite program times the
additional units sold.159

Practically speaking, introducing the VMP concept into the patent infringement
damage estimate debate adds little. Rarely are the data available to calculate the
component price. 160 More basically, the VMP concept applies only when the inputs
are variable, as a car assembler can use more labor and less equipment (Ferrari) or
more robots and fewer line workers (Toyota).161 Yet the date-picker function in
Outlook is added in a fixed proportion, one per program. What considering VMP in
this context does do is to highlight that the appeals court treats software as if it is a
competitive sector, as if there is a single market-determined price for a program
component which must be identified. 162 The meaning of this perspective will become
clearer when contrasting pure competition with the other basic economics model at
the other end of the spectrum, simple monopoly.

153 Soo MARK SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN ECONOMICS 173-74 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
the original theories capitalism from Smith and the marginalist revolution that created two
mainstream economic schools of thought).
154 George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 COLUM. UNIV. J. POL.
ECON. 1, 1-5 (1957).
155 See id. at 5 (discussing the desirability in general of competition as the best economic theory
for consumers).
156See id. at 1-2 (discussing mathematical economists' model for profits).
157 See id.
158 GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., THE PEGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 242 (7th ed.

2003).

159See A.C. Pigou, Real and Money Wage Rates in Relation to Unemployment, 47 ECON. J.

405, 407-08 (1937) (analyzing the value of marginal products for composite commodities).
160See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, '"nfectious" Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or
PromotingResistance 36 RUTGERS L. J. 53, 133-34, 134 n.207 (2004) (stating that the bundling of
software and difficult valuation of intangibles make it impossible for one to "disaggregate the cost
factors").
I" See CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 256,
257 (1977).
1 2 See Lucent IV 580 F.3d 1301, 1323-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (deconstructing the district court's
damages verdict and post-verdict ruling).
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2. Simple Monopoly:
Simple monopoly retains the efficiency criteria of pure competition by setting
163
output at the level where the cost of the next (marginal) unit sold equals its value.
That product cost though is less that the consumer price, which allows for the
existence of "excess" profits. 164 The equivalent of VMP under competition is the
Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) for monopoly. 165
The MRP equates the
productivity of the last component added times the added (marginal) revenue. The
distinction with VMP is the concept that the monopolist has control over the product
price by regulating output. Marginal value declines as units sold increase because
consumers are willing to pay less for more total units-that is why demand curves
slant downward. By contrast, under perfect competition, firms must accept the
market-determined price on a take it or leave it basis. Set a higher price and there
will be no sales; set one lower and there are only losses. The appeals court has
shown a full awareness of the existence of a demand curve for Outlook by suggesting
means by which the curve can be estimated.1 66 However no mention is made that
Microsoft can target a point on the demand curve by adjusting price, or alternatively
by picking a price and adjusting output accordingly. 167 Yet if a would-be licensee like
Microsoft can affect the consumer price, and as the license value is ultimately related
to the consumer price, then the competitiveness of the market must be an aspect of
1 68
determining damages.
Now no one can reasonably claim that Microsoft even with its ninety percent
market share is a simple monopolist (in the terms of economists).69 Microsoft rather
fits into the broad middle range between monopoly and competition known as
1 70
oligopoly, although in this case toward the monopoly end of the spectrum.
Alternatives to (competition for) even the Windows operating system exist in the
forms of the Apple operating system and Linux along with OS/2 Warp (IBP) and
BeOS (Be Inc.), but use is very limited. 171 What has been well documented in the
antitrust case US v. Microsoft in Findings of Fact, Microsoft has indeed exercised
extensive control over prices.1 72 Documented examples include:
"[Microsoft's] decision not to consider the prices of other venders' Intelcompatible PC operating systems when setting the price of Windows 98, for example,
is probative of monopoly power. One would expect a firm in a competitive market to
1 73
pay much closer attention to prices charged by other firms in a market."

163 See Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 525 (1983).
1WId.
1 5
6 AMMER &AMMER, supra note 161, at 257.
166 Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1337-38.
167 See generallyid. (making no mention of the demand curve-output selection process).
168 See id. at 1337 (indicating that a patentee typically licenses its inventions for the "true
economic value" even though such a value rarely if ever exists at the time a patent is licensed).
169 See ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 73 (5th ed.

2004) (asserting that a simple monopolist occupies the entire market).
170 See id. at 67 (asserting that actual markets reside between perfect competition and simple
monopoly).
171 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18, 45 (D.D.C.1999).
172

Id.

at 26-28.

173 Id. at 26.
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[1it is indicative of monopoly power that Microsoft felt that it had
substantial discretion in setting the price of its Windows 98 upgrade
product ....[T]he company could have charged $49 for an upgrade to
Windows 98 ...but the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing
174
price. Microsoft thus opted for the higher price.

3. Assessment:
Given the prior antitrust court-documented discretionary control Microsoft could
and had exercised over its software prices, the appeals court can be faulted for not
recognizing the interaction between the license royalty and the packaged software
price. To Microsoft, the appropriate royalty is not a single value but a relationship
with the software price at the Microsoft-determined sales level.175 Certainly the
appeals court was not alone in this oversight; courts broadly can be faulted for
applying a perfect competition price determination model when the licensee has
many of the powers of a monopolist.17 6 That is, the MRP conceptual model should be
applied, not the VMP as was done in Microsoft.
Certainly licensors recognize that the important value is the total license
revenue generated, not the royalty rate alone, and will be concerned as well with the
price charged for the composite product by the licensee.17 7 The courts must recognize
this importance as well. This distinction leads to the first Cortez Factor:
Cortez Factor 1: Leadingfirms in highly concentratedindustrieslikely have
significant discretionarycontrol over price. When such firms are licensees,
the royalty payments can affect the price chargedfor the composite product
so that the product price and royalty payments are jointly determined.
Courts andjuries must recognize this interactionand not act as if there is a
single, objective, market-determinedroyaltyrate if only it can be identified.

B. Lump-Sum v. Running Royalty
The appeals court subsumed within Georgia-Pacificfactor 2 (see Section II.B
supra) the question of "whether the licensor and licensee would have agreed to a
lump-sum payment or instead to a running royalty based on ongoing sales or
usage."1 78 Clearly, the appeals court is critical of the justification of the trial court in
imposing a lump-sum royalty.17 9 Did the appeals court go far enough in its analysis
of the incentives for one form of royalty over the other to raise a legitimate question
about the trial court decision?
174

Id. at 27.

175See Lucent IV 580 F.3d 1301,

1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (indicating that Microsoft's
argument before the trial court was lacking support in the evidence).
176 See, e.g., id. at 1334 (indicating that the calculation of an exact royalty rate is difficult for
software applications such as the one at issue in the case).
177 See Pigou, supra note 159, at 407-08 (discussing the value of composite products).
178 LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1326.
179 See id. at 1325, 1335.
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1. Certaintyof demand projection
The appeals court documents carefully the costs and benefits of lump-sum,
sometimes called "paid-up" royalties.180 These include for the licensor a shifting of
the risk of market acceptance to the licensee at some risk that the payment will
eventually undervalue the revenue generated by the licensed product.181 Throughout
the license period, the licensor is relieved of the cost and complexity of monitoring
sales or profits so as to determine the appropriate periodic royalty payments.182 For
the licensee the risk exchange is the mirror image; the licensee takes on the risk of
market acceptance up to the amount of the payment while benefiting if the market
value exceeds the pre-paid amount.18 3 The appeals court is completely correct in
these regards. By quoting Cauley the appeals court further indicated a recognition of
the benefit to the patent holder, the licensor, of a lump-sum payment for raising cash
quickly.184

This much is good economics, but there is no effort to consider when one set of
considerations dominates the other.18 5 That is, when to pick one form of payment
over the other? One factor is the predictability of demand.18 6 If the demandmeaning the total revenue generated-for the licensed product can be predicted with
confidence then both sides are more likely to seek a lump sum payment.1 87 In
general, if the product is conventional in its several dimensions then the past is a
reasonable basis for predicting future demand.18 8 Conversely, if the product is a
notable departure-say the iPhone-then demand becomes much more challenging to
predict and the licensee is less likely to take on the significant risk of a paid-up
royalty.189

2. Cost of Capital
Perhaps a more significant, or at least less apparent, factor is differences in the
cost of capital. Typically newer, less established firms with few resources will
(among other factors) pose a higher default risk for investors. 190 To assist investors

180

See id.at 1326.

Id.
182Id.
183 Id.
181

184 Id. ("A lump-sum license 'benefits the patent holder in that it enables the company to raise
a substantial amount of cash quickly'...." (citation omitted)).
185 See, e.g., id.
186 See, e.g., James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Revenue Sharingand Vertical Control in the
Video Rental Industry, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 223, 227 (2001) (discussing the predictability of the
demand of a licensing market, the video movie rental market, in the late 1990s).
187 See Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1325 (showing that both sides did not agree on whether to apply
the lump-sum method to this particular case).
188 See generallyDana & Spier, supra note 186 (discussing uncertainty in demand of the video
movie rental market).
189 See id. at 227 (comparing the demand for newly-released movie rentals to that of older
movie rentals).
190 See Maria Vassalou & Yuhang Xing, Default Risk in Equity Returns, 59 J. FIN. 831, 832-33
(2003) (asserting that small firms have greater default risk than large ones).
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in identifying the default risk several ratings firms exist, the largest among which
include Standard & Poor1 91 and Moody's. 192 Each uses slightly different systems; the
one employed by Moody's is for long term debt (maturities of one year or more):193
* Investment Grade
Aaa - "gilt edged"
Aal, Aa2, Aa3 - high-grade
Al, A2, A3 - upper-medium grade
194
Baal, Baa2, Baa3 - medium grade
* Speculative Grade
Bal, Ba2, Ba3 - speculative elements
BI, B2, B3 - lack characteristics of a desirable investment
Caal, Caa2, Caa3 - bonds of poor standing
Ca - highly speculative
C - lowest rating, extremely poor prospects of attaining any real
195
investment standing
An inverse relationship exists between the credit rating and the historic default
rate as investors wish to be compensated for increased risk taking. 196 "The historic
default rate for Aaa-rated securities is very low. The average default rate from 1970 2000 for Aaa-rated securities over a ten-year period was only 0.67%, well under 1%.
However, as one descends the rating scale into the speculative-grade section, the
default rate increases dramatically. For B-rated securities, the 10-year probability of
default is 44.57%." 197 The effect on interest rates is quite substantial. On one day
tax exempt municipal bond rates with 2015 maturities averaged 1. 7 9 % with a rating
of Aaa and 3.24% for a Baa bond (still considered to be investment grade).198 That is,
even within investment grade bonds, the credit rating can mean interest rates nearly
twice those available to the highest rated municipalities. 199 The particulars differ,
but the pattern applies to corporate bonds as well. 20 0 Indeed, finding startup funds is
20 1
such a significant factor it is a major component of entrepreneurship textbooks.
191 S&P -

Ratings - United States, STANDARD & POOR'S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/

ratings/en/us/ (last visited May 6, 2010).
192 MOODYS.COM, http://www.moodys.com/cust/default.asp (last visited May 6, 2010).
193 See MOODY, MOODY'S RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 8, 10 (Moody's Investor Servs.,
June 2009), http://v3.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatings
Symbolsand%20Definitions.pdf.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196

See id.

Rating Definitions, MOODYSKOREA.COM, http://www.moodyskorea.com/english/definition
.asp (last visited May 6, 2010).
198 See Bond
Yields - Market Data Center, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/
public/page/2_3021-bondyield.html (last visited May 6, 2010) (on file with The John Marshall
Review of Intellectual Property Law).
199 Jd.
200 Compare Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield: Percent, ECONOMAGIC.COM,
197

http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/fedstl/aaa+2 (last visited May 6, 2010) (indicating that
the Aaa rate for 2010 is 5.26%), with Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yiel: Percent,
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The issue of capital access is a relevant one for infringement damage
consideration for one model is large, established firms licensing innovative
products/processes from startups. 20 2 Binder, former CEO of Amgen, the highly
successful biotech startup firm, wrote of the time, "Once Amgen grew large enough,
we could afford to license other companies' discoveries instead of the other way
around." 20 3 Indeed, one of the oft-claimed benefits of patents is to permit small (and
presumably asset-poor) firms to negotiate with large ones without risking the loss of
their inventions. 20 4 From another text on entrepreneurship, this one for small firms,
"Before sharing information on a new idea to obtain financing or marketing
205
assistance, that idea must first be protected as a trade secret or by a patent."
The access/cost of capital issue says that the small startup firm may prefer a
lump-sum royalty as a means of securing funding from the larger, established
licensee. 20 6 Microsoft for example in 2003, close to when Lucent filed the initial
action against it, had a "legendary cash stockpile" of over $49 billion. 207 Of course,
for the opportunity cost of extending credit and added risk taken on, the licensee
agreeing to a lump-sum payment would expect a lower total payment than of paying
on a running royalty basis. 20 8 In economists' terms, the small firm has a high
discount rate and is willing to take a smaller payment today than the promise of a
larger one tomorrow. 20 9 But as a would-be licensee is more knowledgeable about the
value of the invention it is in a reduced risk position compared to a less informed
lender and can act as an efficient bank from the perspective of the licensor. 210 That
is, when there is a substantial difference in the cost of capital between the licensor
and licensee, a lump-sum royalty agreement can be efficient for both entities.
ECONOMAGIC.COM, http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/fedstl/baa+2
2010) (indicating that the Baa rate for 2010 is 6.25 %).
201

See,

e.g., ROBERT D. HISRICH & MICHAEL P.

PETERS,

(last visited May 6,

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

381,

389

(McGraw-Hill/Irwin 5th ed. 2002) (discussing startup funding).
202 See generally Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing IntellectualProperty and
Technology from the Financially-Troubledor Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to
Minimize the Risk in a Lincensee's IntellectualProperty and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. LAW.
1649 (2000) (stating that the IP license allows the licensor to waive the right to sue the licensee for
infringement in exchange for fees or royalties; and those royalties could be useful capital to a small
or startup company with valuable IP and little capital).
203 GORDON BINDER & PHILIP BASHE, SCIENCE LESSONS:

WHAT THE BUSINESS OF BIOTECH

TAUGHT ME ABOUT MANAGEMENT 157 (Harvard Bus. Press 2008).
204 See Cieri & Morgan, supra note 202, at 1649-50 (stating that some intellectual property
assets are owned by small businesses or financially unstable individuals or startups who lack capital
and need "financial investors, business partners, or entities willing to pay to use those assets").
205 JEROME A. KATZ & RICHARD P. GREEN, ENTREPRENEURIAL SMALL BUSINESS 610 (2d ed.
2009).
206 See Philip Mendes, To License a Patent-or, to Assign it: Factors Influencing the Choice,
WIPe
DOCUMENTS,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/licenseassign_
patent.pdf (last visited May 6, 2010).
207 Todd Bishop, Microsoft's Cash Reserve at $49 Billion, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July
18, 2003, at 1, available athttp://www.seattlepi.com/business/131322_msftearnl8.html.
208 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to
Innovate AfterMedlmmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 994 (2009).
201)Id. (stating that the lump sum payment would need to be calculated using an "anticipated
discount" based on the "projected time value of money over the life of the license").
210 See Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Geography of Investment: Informed
Trading andAsset Prices, 109 U. CHI. J. POL. ECON. 811, 812 (2001).
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3. Due diligence
The licensor, most especially in cases of an exclusive license, is always concerned
but what the licensee invests sufficient funds and attention that the product reaches
its market potential. 211 "If this issue is not covered, then the exclusive licensee can
sit on the technology and keep others from exploiting it and bringing money to the
licensor." 21 2 One approach to achieving diligence is to identify milestones in the
license agreements, with specific dates. Milestones can include the completion of
specific tasks, penalties (including termination) for not meeting goals, or periodic
(annual) minimum payments. 213 At the extreme, a lump-sum royalty is a very
214
effective inducement for the licensee to diligence.

4. Assessment
The appeals court had a grasp of basic economics, in particular the methods for
projecting demand and a recognition that a pre-paid royalty serves as a source of
capital to the licensor. 21 5 That said, and the appeals court is certainly not alone in
that regard, the court did not take the next intellectual step to recognize the degree
of predictability of demand, and the consequence for the desirability of a lump-sum
royalty, particularly for the licensor. 21 6 That condition leads to the second Cortez
Factor:
Cortez Factor 2: Predictability of demand for a licensed product or
composite product reduces the risk of a lump -sum royalty for licensors and
licensees alike andincreases the likelihood ofit being used.
The appeals court also gives evidence of a fixed view of negotiations as being
between "equals." 217 While that precept may be the appropriate legal basis for
considering reasonable royalties, it certainly does not reflect the reality of the range
of firm sizes and access to capital, which is partly reflected in the differential interest
rates for levels of credit ratings. 218 When lump-sum royalties are evaluated as a
means for cash-rich licensees to fund asset-poor licensors, then the practice can be
211 Donna Bobrowicz, A Checklistfor NegotiatingLicenses Agreements in IntellectualProperty
Management, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1142 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., MHIR 2007).

212

Id.

Clinton H. Neagley, Patent Licensing for Small Agricultural Biotechnology Companies, in
INTELL. PROP. MGMT. IN HEALTH AND AGRIC. INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 121319 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., MHIR, 2007).
214 See Robert Goldscheider, The Negotiation of Royalties and Other Sources of Income from
Licensing, 36 IDEA 1, 9, 11 (1995).
215 See Lucent IV 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Richard Cauley's book which
explains that the lump sum license benefits the licensor).
216 Id. (stating that with a lump sum fee the licensee must pay the entire amount agreed upon,
whether the technology is successful or even used in the future).
217 See id. at 1324 (explaining the "willing licensor-licensee" approach as an example of equal
negotiations).
218 See MOODY, supranote 193, at 8.
213
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recognized as an efficient means for financing small, innovative firms with higher
costs of capital.21 9 That leads to the third Cortez Factor:
Cortez Factor 3: Lump-sum royalties can be an efficient and hence
profitable way for large cash-rich licensees to finance small asset-poor
licensors when the licensoris willing to a lower implicitroyalty rate.
Finally, a licensor is always concerned that the licensee, particularly in cases of
exclusive licenses, act speedily to commercialize the invention and not allow it to
languish. 220 A substantial lump-sum royalty is an effective if not exclusive means of
incentivizing the licensee, for which the licensor should be willing to concede a lower
overall royalty payment than when using other less favorable license terms. 221 As
the fourth Cortez Factor this can matter can be summarized as:
Cortez Factor 4: A lump -sum royalty is one of several means to provide an
incentive for the licensee to act with diligence to commercialize a product or
process in exchange for which the licensor should be willing to accept a
reductionin the license payments.
Of course, a lump-sum royalty would make economic sense to the licensee only if
the total anticipated royalty payments were notably lower when lump-sum than
running. 222 In effect the licensee is lending money to the licensor with the fee
223
reflected as a lower overall sum than if the payments were spread out over time.
As regards Microsoft in particular, Lucent, a large firm in its own right, does not fit
the idea of a small startup in need of growth capital.2 24 Nor is it likely that a
sophisticated firm like Microsoft would agree to both a high (8%) royalty rate and a
lump-sum payment, as was imposed by the trial court decision.2 25 Either is
conceivable, but both unlikely. Thus the appeals court seemingly made a good
economic assessment, if perhaps not for the correct reasons.

C. Value Creation
The appeals court highlights Georgia-Pacificfactor 11 (see Section II.B supra) as
focusing on the extent of use of an invention as indicative of its value. 226 "Implicit in
this factor is the premise that an invention used frequently is generally more
See Goldscheider, supra note 214, at 9, 11.
Mendes, supra note 206, at 5.
221 See Goldscheider, supra note 214, at 8-9.
222 See Goldscheider, supra note 214, at 8.
223 See Mendes, supra note 206, at 2-3.
221 Alcatal-Lucent, Hoover's Company Records, Feb. 23, 2010, at 2 (identifying Lucent's annual
sales at $23,938,900,000 and net income at $7,291,300,000).
225 See Lucent HI, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2008), affd in part, vacated,in
part, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (sustaining the jury's verdict based on Lucent's expert
testimony that eight percent of the retail selling price of the patented technology at issue would be a
219

220

reasonable royalty).
226 Lucent IV 580 F.3d 1301, 1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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valuable than a comparable invention used infrequently." 227 In a narrow sense this
conjecture is likely to be true; use equates to value.228 But viewed narrowly like this
implies that use is the only source of income and that use and value are
approximately lineally related. 229 Is that conjecture justified?

1. Sourees of value
Certainly the use of an invention is a major component of value. 230 Per unit
value is unlikely to be constant over a large range due to the expected downward
sloping demand curve; whether total revenue (units times price) will increase with
increased sales depends on the elasticity of demand for the product. 231 This is
232
standard economics and is reflected in the comments of the appeals court.
However, in the contemporary world value is not necessarily created only from direct
product sales. This is particularly true for web applications where advertising
revenue is the major source of income and rising in importance. 233 Google the search
engine giant in 2008 earned $21.8 billion in revenues, ninety-seven percent of which
was from advertisements.2 3 4 There is even talk that Microsoft will provide Office, the
base of Lucent, to users for free and earn its return through advertising or
"commercial derivative services." 235
Under this revenue model, use in the form of web site visits is a component of
236
value; advertisers seek the highest traffic sites for presenting their products.
However, it is the number of times users "click" on an advertisement that triggers
payments to the site host.2 3 7 More users increase the probability of a "click" but the
demographics of users, the targeted market segment, is the important consideration
of the effectiveness of ads. 238 So value creating in the web world, and computer
software more generally, is more removed from the "use equates to value" model than
is implied by the appeals court analysis.

2'7 Id.

at 1333.
228 Id.
221) See id. (summarizing Microsoft's argument that the frequency of the use of the patented
technology at issue is irrelevant).
230 See Bush v. Remington Rand, Inc., 213 F.2d 456, 465 (2d Cir. 1954).
231 POSNER, supra note 151, at 273-74.
232 LucentIV 580 F.3d at 1326.
233 E.g., Google Inc., Annual Report, 37, 39 (Feb. 13, 2009).
234 Id.
2:35Scott M. Fulton, III, Inside Oiee Web Apps
Will Word Web App hold a candle to Word
2010. BETANEWS.COM (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.betanews.com/article/Inside-Office-Web-AppsWill-Word-Web-App -hold-a-candle-to-Word-2010/1253650380.
236 Carl Bialik, Sites Profitfrom Google's Ad System, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at B4D.
237 Id.
238

Louis

E. BOONE ET AL., CONTEMPORARY MARKETING:

(2010) (describing "psychographic segmentation").

SECOND CANADIAN EDITION 275
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2. Assessment
The appeals court in invoking narrowly Georgia-Pacificfactor 11 to equate use
with value dates itself by implying the existence of a simple commercial world where
the dominant revenue model requires realizing value through direct use. 23

9

The

enormous success of Google, which provides its search service for free and earns
income through ad revenues, shows just how increasingly inapplicable that simple
model is.240 In terms of the Cortez Factors, this situation can be described as:
Cortez Factor 5: When a licensedproduct value is dependent even in part
on generatedadvertisingrevenue or derivative services where targetingthe
appropriate demographic is more important than sheer numbers of users
then there is only an indirectrelationshipbetween use and value.
Now Office at the time of Lucent was indeed sold so the appeals court was
correct in suggesting that the value of the contested date picker function was to some
degree associated with its use. 241
made .242

But that assumption increasingly cannot be

D. Market Dominance and Value
Microsoft is clearly a hugely profitable company with a ninety percent market
share for its operating system and a seventy to eighty percent profit margin around
the time of Lucent.243 Typically in the absence of a simple monopoly such levels of
profitability attract entrant firms which drive down the price. 244 Certainly there

have been competitor operating systems. 245 Yet Microsoft's market share has been
declining very slowly. 246

To understand why requires some understanding of the

particular characteristics of software use. From that base it is easier to appreciate
the value of a component part like Lucent's date-picker function.

1. User value in the consumer software market and market share
For many products (BMW and Mercedes-Benz cars), scarcity creates exclusivity
which enhances value. 247 That is an easy relationship to understand, but it applies
239 See LucentIV 580 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

240 Google Inc., supra note 233, at pmbl.
241 LueentIV 580 F.3d at 1321.
212

See id.

Id. at 1335 (indicating the profit margin); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9,
19 (D.D.C. 1999).
2H See POSNER, supra note 151, at 275-76.
245 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
24(6 Gregg Keizer, Windows Loses Market Share to Mobile Operating Systems, PC WORLD,
Jan. 3, 2010.
247 E.g., Not Exactly a Recession Beater: This Sharp-edged Lamborghini Roadster Goes for
$1.6Mil]ion, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 15, 2009, 7:31 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities
243

/driveonpost/2009/09/68499029/1.
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only to products which are not shared. 248 For consumer software 249 there is a major
benefit in being able to share files among users 250; word processing programs are a
clear example. 25 1 At the same time, consumers prefer to be able to use the same
approaches on different platforms and computer brands-in short not to be required
to learn/relearn multiple programs. 252 These preferences mean there is a benefit to
the leading software supplier even if its products are not the best by some technical
measure. 253 Into the future, independent software providers will be drawn to the
leading brand as it promises the largest potential market.
Together these two factors create what has been called a "vicious cycle"-a
positive feedback loop benefiting Microsoft's operating system Windows. 254 Its "large
market share creates incentives for [independent software venders] to develop
applications first and foremost for windows .... " 255 "Each [independent software
vender] realizes that the new operating system could attract a significant number of
users if enough [independent software venders] developed applications for it; but few
[independent software venders] want to sink resources into developing for [a new
operating] system until it becomes established." 256 Thus consumers have the
incentive to purchase the dominant software program for current compatibility with
other users along with anticipated future new applications, while the independent
software industry has the incentive to provide more applications for that same
program, indeed a vicious cycle from the perspective of a potential entrant into the
257
operating system market.
For Microsoft, maintaining this "cycle" in its benefit requires its software
offerings, whether Microsoft-provided or produced by an independent vendor, serve
the requirements of the vast majority of users.258 One observer quotes Microsoft as
"feeling that the final product does need to address the everyday needs of about 90%
of its usage base, or perhaps 90% of the needs of all its usage base." 259 Implicit in
this position is the requirement to prevent an entrant from establishing a foot hold
260
through a superior product not available from or through Microsoft.

248 Franck Vigneron & Lester W. Johnson, A Review and a ConceptualFramework ofPrestigeSeeking Consumer BRhavior ACAD. MARKETING SCI. REV., 1999 No. 1, at 5, availahle at http://

www.amsreview.org/articles/vigneronO l-1999.pdf.
241)The term "consumer software" is meant to refer to software used directly by individuals, in
contradistinction to software like server systems which function a level or two removed for direct
consumer use.
250 See Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
251 Steve Hamm, More to Life than the Office, Bus. WK., July 3, 2006, at 68, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/0627/b3991412.htm.
252 Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs.*An Overview with
Applications to IndustrialOrganization,Macroeconomics, and InternationalTrade, 62 REV. ECON.
STUD. 515, 517 (1995).
253 Id. at 517-19 (giving several reasons for not switching software products).
254 Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 21.
257
Id. at 20-21.
258 Id.
2'9 Fulton, supranote 235.
260 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d. at 22-23 (explaining barriers to
operating system market entry from a consumers perspective).
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Microsoft is legendary for competing intensively and for spending extensive
sums to prevent possible competitors to its key operating system market. 261 Initially,
Microsoft sought to prevent entry through web browsers like Netscape's Navigator by
spending considerable sums to place its own web portal Internet Explorer free on
Windows. 262 "Microsoft decided to bind Internet Explorer to Windows in order to
prevent Navigator from weakening the applications barrier to entry, rather than for
any pro-competitive purpose." 263 That effort was the basis for the Department of
Justice antitrust action. 264 More recently, Microsoft is attempting to challenge
Google's dominance of the search engine through its new Bing.265 Clearly Google's
enormous ad revenues are an attraction, but Microsoft is also acting defensively to
prevent Google from displacing Microsoft's licensed software products by providing
open source programs through Google's Software as a Service offering in direct
competition with Office. 266 The effort has been costly for Microsoft with $3.5 billion
spent over three years prior to Bing.267 And expenditures continue with an estimated
268
up to $100 million advertising campaign for Bing, Microsoft's largest ever.

2. Strategic behavior
Microsoft is engaged in strategic behavior, which can be defined as measures
taken by a firm to improve the market environment to its advantage. 269 In
particular, the preceding describes non-cooperative strategic behavior which operates
like a zero sum game-one firm's gain is a competitor's loss. 270 A component of
strategic behavior is strategic pricing under which a firm sets a price considering
other factors than the short term profit generated from a product in isolation. For
example, in a practice known as limit pricing, a firm with lower average costs
(possibly due in part to a higher market share) may price below the profitmaximizing level in order to prevent entry by a rival. 271 This would be possible if for
example the dominant firm could price at a level profitable for itself, but below the
average cost for the would-be entrant. 27 2 Since the competitor could not enter the
market without incurring losses, it would be deterred, if not thwarted altogether,
261Id.
262

at 21.
Id. at 49.

2 3 Id.
261 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against
Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets (May 18, 1998) (on file with The
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law).
265 Farhad Manjoo, The Search fora Rival,TIME, Aug. 31, 2009, at 38-39.
266 See James Gaskin, Google Apps Sync for Microsoft Outlook, ITWORLD (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:00
AM), http://www.itworld.com/software/77645/google - apps -sync-microsoft-outlook.
267 Peter Burrows, Is Qi Lu Microsofts Search Engine Savio?, BUS. WEEK (May 28, 2009,
11:30 AM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09 23/b4134040743599.htm.
268 Abbey Klaassen & Rupal Parekh, Microsoft Looks to JWT to Market New Search Engine:
Web Giant Expected to Spend Up to $100 Million in Bid to Win Share From Google, Yahoo,
ADVERTISING AGE (April 1, 2009, 6:04 PM), http://www.evri.com (search for "Microsoft Looks to JWT
to Market New Search Engine").
2 9 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C.1999).
See id.
271Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1061 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984).
270

272 See id.
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while the established firm would continue to make additional profits into the distant
future, even if at somewhat reduced levels.273
Numerous other examples and scenarios for limit pricing exist, 27 4 but the
relevant point here is that a firm in determining a price to charge is considering
factors beyond the limits of a particular market as characterized by the demand
curve. 27 5 That is, the firm is not setting the price in accordance with the point where
additional revenues are equal to additional costs (MR = MC)276 (see Section III.A
277
supra) but rather with a broader strategic goal in mind, such as entry deterrence.
What strategic pricing means is that the narrow confines of pricing such as the
contribution of a part to the value of the whole is not relevant, or at least
predominant. 278 In terms of license royalties, basing the royalty on the contribution
to value of the composite product islargely irrelevant. 279 Prices are set considering
280
factors beyond the confines of a particular market.
Consider now the potential value to Microsoft of the Lucent date-picker function.
Presumably the option to select dates conveniently is necessary function for a multifaceted package like Outlook, as was determined by the jury. 28 1 If Microsoft did not
incorporate a date function in Outlook-in violation of efforts to serve 90 percent of
the needs of all its customers 282-it would be easier for a competitor to offer an option
with that function. 283 Such competition to Outlook could then serve as an entry to
add additional programs and eventually upset Microsoft's dominance. 28 4 Indeed that
is the approach Google is taking now (see Section IV.A.a supra).285
To avoid that outcome Microsoft would be expected to be willing to pay a royalty
rate greater that the nominal contribution of the date-picker function to the overall
Outlook program package. 28 6 Microsoft would be valuing the function in regards to
its overall, long term market position and not narrowly on Outlook sales. 28 7 Note
that this consideration transcends the question if the royalty should be based on the
entire composite program, or the proportion of the base of the date-picker function to
that program (see Section II.C supra).288
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278 Mark Cooper, Ph.D., Antitrust as Consumer Protectionin the New Economy: Lessons from
the Microsoft Case, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 846-49 (2001).
279 See, e.g., LucentIv 580 F.3d at 1336.
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Of course, the Lucent product was not the only date-picker function available to
Microsoft when Outlook was programmed. 28 9 And according to the appeals court
conclusions the Lucent product had "at best, only a slight advantage over what is
arguably the closest prior art."290 The substitutability of prior art is of course a
factual question in each case. 291 The point being made here is that, for a given
degree of closeness to prior art, strategic pricing decisions will value the current art
product more highly than if pricing were considered in the standard context of a
single product market and equating marginal revenues with marginal cost.

3. Assessment
The consideration of strategic behavior as affecting royalty rates is perhaps the
most significant gap in the appeals court economic analysis in Lucent.292 When
strategic valuation issues come into play the standard models of perfect competition
and simple monopoly go out the window. 293 Value-perhaps willingness to pay is a
better term-is more related to disadvantaging competitors by leaving no new
opportunities to be exploited than profit maximization in the single product
market. 294 And with Microsoft's seventy percent profit margins there is much to
protect and significant funds to use for doing so. 2 9 5 In terms of the Cortez Factors:
Cortez Factor 6: When leading firms in an industry follow strategic
behavior to limit entry then pricing may be set outside profit maximizing
levels to inhibit competitors. In terms of royalty levels, strategic behavior
considerationsmean licensees may be willing to pay rates well beyond a
level justifiable when consideringonly a speeifie product market. Strategie
pricing considerationsalso take eonsiderations outside the narrowlimits of
basing damage estimates on the entire product or, alternatively, the
proportion of the base contributedby the lieensedproduet.
This said, was at the time of the infringement the date-picker function worth
eight percent or thereabouts of the total sales of Outlook? Probably not, if indeed the
prior art was as close as claimed. But was it worth more to Microsoft than the
proportion of the base making up Outlook? Probably yes. So the appellate court was

28) Id. at 1313 (discussing the FXFE system's process of a user entering data and sequences
routinely employed in automated teller machines).
290

Id. at 1335.
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(citations omitted).
292 See generallyLucent IV 580 F.3d 1301 (omitting strategic behavior analysis).
293 See Cooper, supra note 278, at 846-49 (discussing Microsoft's strategic pricing).
294 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26 (D.D.C. 1999) ("While Microsoft may
not be able to stave off all potential paradigm shifts through innovation, it can thwart some and
delay others by improving its own products to the greater satisfaction of consumers.").
295 Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1335.
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not wrong in vacating the trial court's damage assessment for retrial. 296 It just did so
297
for the wrong reasons.

CONCLUSION

The economic analysis of the appeals court in Microsoft can be said to have
found the trees but missed the forest. The "trees" in this instance is the rejection of
the $358 million damage estimate against Microsoft for the infringement of the
Lucent-licensed "Day patent." The method disclosed there-in was used as the
technical basis for a date-picker function used in Microsoft Outlook and several other
programs. 298 The combination of the large damage award ($500 million with accrued
interest) and a lump-sum payout indeed seems excessive given the evidence
presented.
Conversely, the 'forest' is the complexity of economic factors and relationships
among firms which nowhere entered into the analysis of the appeals court. Thus if
the court can be given an 'A' for the correct decision, the logic behind that position
deserves only a C+. Indeed, the perspective on economic activity which can be
inferred from the appeals court's statements characterizes a rather quaint system in
which revenues are derived only from the sale of individual products which
themselves are composed of parts the value of which is related to the proportional
contribution. 299 Moreover, licensors and licensees are treated as equals in the
market and seem not to recognize that levels and forms (lump-sum or running) of
royalties are merely alternative payment methods which may have different value to
a licensor or licensee and hence are negotiated in multi-dimensions as a matrix of
value.300

For example, the licensee may have significant discretionary control over price
which means that the product price and the royalty value to the licensor are jointly
determined. 30 1 Or an established licensee may in effect serve as a lower cost banker
to the licensor by offering a lump-sum royalty in exchange for a lower implicit royalty
rate. 30 2 Treating the parties as willing equals in negotiations may be good law but is
303
weak economics.
Perhaps most significantly, nowhere in the decision is there an indication-and
the appeals court is by no means alone in the legal system in holding this
circumscribed perception of economic activity-of a market in which dominant firms
act strategically to position themselves and particularly to stymie competitors. Yet
296 Id. at 1336-38 (indicating why the jury's verdict related to the entire market value
calculation was erroneous).
297

See id.

298 Id.
299

at 1308-09, 1310-11 (providing the case's background and discussing the Day patent).

Id. at 1336-38 (discussing that the entire market value rule allows for the recovery of

damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features).
300 See id. at 1324-25 (illustrating that negotiations are entered into by two willing and equal
parties).
301See, e.g., Dana & Spier, supra note 186, at 224 (demonstrating an extreme example of joint
product price/royalty value determination in the video movie rental market).
302 See Lucent IV 580 F.3d at 1323.
303 See id. at 1324-25.
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that occurs regularly and means the marginal conditions (as economists call them)
for setting quantities sold and prices no longer apply. Under these conditions, for
infringement damage calculations, the distinction between royalties based on the
proportion of the base or the entire market value are not pertinent. 304 These new
conditions apply broadly where dominant firms exist, but the software and web
industries are particularly relevant examples at this time for they combine strong
single firm dominance and large profit margins which give the lead firms both the
incentive and financial wherewithal to act strategically.
In short, the courts need to acquire a more nuanced understanding of how firms
compete and the ramifications for acceptable royalty rates and terms. As a step in
that direction the following six Cortez Factors are presented to augment the 12
Georgia-Pacifie factors in helping determine appropriate damages. The Cortez
Factors however are specifically focused on reasonable royalty calculations.
Cortez Factor 1: Leadingfirms in highly concentratedindustrieslikely have
significant discretionarycontrol over price. When such firms are licensees,
the royalty payments affect the price charged for the composite product so
that the productprice and royalty payments are jointly determined. Courts
andjuriesmust recognize this interactionand not act as if there is a single,
objective, market-determinedroyaltyrate if only it can be identified.
Cortez Factor 2: Predictability of demand for a licensed product or
composite productreduces the risk of a lump -sum for licensors and licensees
alike andincreases the likelihood of being used.
Cortez Factor 3: Lump-sum royalties can be an efficient and hence
profitable way for large cash-rich licensees to finance small asset-poor
licensors when the licensoris willing to lower implicit royaltyrate.
Cortez Factor 4: A lump -sum royalty is one of several means to provide an
incentive for the licensee to act with diligence to commercialize a product or
process in exchange for which the licensor should be willing to accept a
reductionin the license payments.
Cortez Factor 5: When a licensedproduct value is dependent even in part
on generatedadvertisingrevenue or derivative services where targetingthe
appropriate demographic is more important than sheer numbers of users
then there is only an indirectrelationshipbetween use and value.
Cortez Factor 6: When leading forms in an industry follow strategic
behavior to limit entry then pricing may be set outside profit maximizing
levels to inhibit competitors. In terms of royalty levels, strategic behavior
considerationsmean licensees may be willing to pay rates well beyond a
level justifiable when consideringonly a specific product market. Strategic
304 See Lucent IV 580 F.33d at 1336 (discussing that for the entire market value rule to apply,
the patentee must prove that the patented article or process covers the "basis for customer demand"
(citation omitted)).
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pricing considerationsalso take considerations outside the narrowlimits of
basing damage estimates on the entire product or, alternatively, the
proportion of the base contributedby the licensedproduct.

